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Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory, and the literature building from 
it, provide theories of risk attitudes based on a 
few  regularities.  Most  importantly,  evaluation 
of an outcome is influenced by how it compares 
to a reference point, with people exhibiting both 
a  significantly  greater  aversion  to  losses  than 
appreciation of gains, and a diminishing sen-
sitivity to changes in an outcome as it moves 
farther  from  the  reference  point.  In  addition, 
people weight the probability of a prospect non-
linearly, overweighting small probabilities and 
underweighting high probabilities.
The  implications  of  prospect  theory  have 
been  studied  with  several  different  specifica-
tions of the reference point, including the status 
quo, lagged status quo, and the mean of the cho-
sen lottery. These various approaches explain 
many risk attitudes that are inconsistent with the 
classical diminishing-marginal-utility-of-wealth 
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model, but they also generate mutually inconsis-
tent predictions that to our knowledge have not 
been formally reconciled. Under a status quo 
specification, loss aversion predicts the substan-
tial dislike of modest-scale risks involving both 
gains and losses that has been widely observed, 
and diminishing sensitivity predicts the risk lov-
ingness in high-probability losses found by many 
researchers in the laboratory.
1 Under specifica-
tions based on the lagged status quo—such as 
in Richard H. Thaler and Eric J. Johnson (1990) 
and Francisco Gomes (2005)—diminishing sen-
sitivity predicts the willingness to take unfavor-
able risks to regain the previous status quo. This 
“disposition  effect,”  which  has  been  observed 
by  Terrance  Odean  (1998)  for  small  investors 
and by David Genesove and Christopher Mayer 
(2001) for homeowners, is inconsistent with the 
substantial  risk  aversion  predicted  by  a  status 
quo  model  for  gambles  involving  both  gains 
1 As has been pointed out by many researchers and formal-
ized by Rabin (2000), nontrivial modest-scale risk aversion 
is calibrationally inconsistent with the classical diminish-
ing-marginal-utility-of-wealth  model.  For  instance,  a 
person with $1 million in lifetime wealth who has CRRA 
utility and who rejects a “fifty-fifty lose $500 or gain $550” 
gamble would also turn down an equal-probability bet of 
losing  $4,000  or  gaining  $100,000,000,000,000.  While 
nobody would turn down the large-scale bet, most people 
would turn down the smaller gamble. Nicholas Barberis, 
Ming Huang, and Thaler (2006), for example, find that the 
majority  of  MBA  students,  financial  advisors,  and  even 
very rich investors (with median financial wealth over $10 
million) reject the $500–$550 bet.
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and losses relative to the current status quo. And 
under specifications based on the chosen lottery’s 
certainty equivalent—such as in the disappoint-
ment-aversion models of David E. Bell (1985), 
Graham  Loomes  and  Robert  Sugden  (1986), 
and  Faruk  Gul  (1991)—loss  aversion  implies 
substantial aversion to any risk. This strong risk 
aversion, which is apparent in consumers’ choice 
of  low  insurance  deductibles  and  purchase  of 
extremely  expensive  extended  warranties  and 
automobile service contracts, is inconsistent with 
the risk lovingness in losses found in the lab and 
in the case of the disposition effect.
This paper uses the model from Ko ˝szegi and 
Rabin (2006) and an extension to study monetary 
risk, unifying the seemingly different risk atti-
tudes noted above as manifestations of the same 
preferences in different domains, and making 
novel  predictions  about  behavior  in  situations 
not studied in the related literature. Our model 
(a) combines the reference-dependent “gain-loss 
utility”  with  standard  “consumption  utility”; 
(b) bases the reference point to which outcomes 
are  compared  on  endogenously  determined 
lagged beliefs; and, to incorporate probabilistic 
beliefs, (c) allows for stochastic reference points. 
Because of feature (a), our theory is consistent 
with aversion to all large-scale risk as predicted 
by classical expected-utility theory. Because of 
feature (b), it predicts both risk lovingness in 
response to surprise modest-scale losses, and—
since  anticipated  premium  payments  do  not 
generate sensations of loss while bad outcomes 
in uncertain situations do—first-order risk aver-
sion when a risk and the possibility to insure it 
are expected. Hence, our theory matches both 
status quo prospect theory and disappointment 
aversion in domains where these models have 
been applied, and more generally provides com-
parative-statics predictions on the extent of risk 
taking as a function of the environment. Because 
of features (b) and (c), our theory predicts that 
the prior expectation of risk, even if it can now 
be avoided, decreases risk aversion. Unlike all 
the  theories  above,  therefore,  it  predicts  less 
risk aversion when deciding whether to remove 
expected  risk  than  when  deciding  whether  to 
take on that risk.
For a wealth level w and reference wealth 
level  r,  Section  I  specifies  a  person’s  utility 
as u 1w|r2 ; m 1w2 1 m1m 1w2 2 m 1r22. The 
  reference-independent  “consumption  utility,”   
m  1  w 2  ,  corresponds  to  the  classical  notion   
of  outcome-based  utility.  Gain-loss  utility, 
m1m1w2 2 m1r22,  depends  on  the  difference 
between the consumption utility of the outcome 
and of the reference level, with the shape of m 
corresponding to the loss aversion and dimin-
ishing sensitivity of prospect theory. Some of 
our  results  are  established  by  assuming  only 
what is commonly taken to be the stronger of 
these two forces, loss aversion.
We assume that the reference point relative 
to which a person evaluates an outcome is her 
recent beliefs about that outcome. An employee 
who had expected a $50,000 salary will assess a 
salary of $40,000 as a loss, and a taxpayer who 
had expected to pay $30,000 in taxes will treat 
a $20,000 tax bill as a gain. Because a person 
may be uncertain about outcomes, our theory 
allows for the reference point to be a distribu-
tion G1 # 2, with a wealth outcome w then evalu-
ated with “mixed feelings” as the average of the 
different assessments u1w0r2 generated by the r 
possible under G1 # 2. For simplicity, we abstract 
from nonlinear decision weights: given a (sto-
chastic or deterministic) reference point, a sto-
chastic wealth outcome is evaluated according 
to its expected reference-dependent utility.
Our model of how utility depends on beliefs 
could be combined with any theory of how these 
beliefs are formed. As an imperfect but at the 
same time disciplined and largely realistic first 
pass,  we  assume  that  a  person  correctly  pre-
dicts her probabilistic environment and her own 
behavior in that environment, so that her beliefs 
fully reflect the true probability distribution of 
outcomes. We begin in Section II by considering 
“surprise” (low-probability) decisions, modelled 
in extreme form as situations where expectations 
are given exogenously to the actual choice set. 
To illustrate implications for modest-scale risk, 
where consumption utility is approximately lin-
ear, consider a person’s decision on whether to 
pay $55 to insure a 50 percent chance of hav-
ing to pay $100. If she had expected to retain 
the status quo of $0, our model makes the same 
prediction as prospect theory: because of dimin-
ishing sensitivity, she does not wish to insure the 
risk. If she had expected to pay $55 for insur-
ance, however, paying that amount generates no 
gain or loss, while taking the gamble exposes 
her to a fifty-fifty chance of losing $45 or gain-
ing $55. With a conventional estimate of two-VOL. 97 NO. 4 1049 KO �SzEgI ANd RABIN: REFERENCE-dEPENdENT RISK ATTITudES
to-one loss aversion, she strongly dislikes this 
gamble and buys the insurance. Yet if a person 
had been expecting risk to start with, paying $0 
instead of $100 can decrease expected losses, 
and paying $100 might just decrease expected 
gains, so the gamble is less aversive. When the 
ex ante expected risk is the gamble itself, this 
decreased  risk  aversion  can  be  interpreted  as 
an endowment effect for risk. When the ex ante 
expected uncertainty is very large, $100 cannot 
much change the extent to which money is eval-
uated as a loss rather than a gain, so the person 
is close to risk neutral.
In Sections III and IV, we study attitudes to 
anticipated risks. We identify two implications of 
our model: a person is more risk averse when she 
anticipates a risk and the possibility to insure it 
than when she does not—always displaying first-
order risk aversion—and among such decisions 
regarding anticipated risk, she is more risk averse 
when she can commit to insure ahead of time.
When a decision is made shortly before the 
outcomes resulting from it occur, at that moment 
the reference point is fixed by past expectations, 
so that the decision maker maximizes expected 
utility taking the reference point as given. Being 
fully rational, therefore, she can expect behavior 
only if she is willing to follow it through, given 
a reference point determined by the expectation 
to do so. Formalizing this idea, in Section III 
we import from Ko ˝szegi and Rabin (2006) the 
concept  of  an  “unacclimating  personal  equi-
librium” (UPE), defined as behavior where the 
stochastic  outcome  generated  by  utility-maxi-
mizing  choices  conditional  on  expectations 
coincides  with  expectations.  Positing  that  a 
person can make any plans she knows she will 
follow through, our analysis assumes that she 
chooses her favorite UPE, the “preferred per-
sonal equilibrium” (PPE).
Applying PPE, we predict a very strong taste 
for planning and executing the purchase of small-
scale insurance. The reason is a formalization 
and elaboration of some previous researchers’ 
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1984) psychologi-
cal intuition that money given up in regular bud-
geted purchases is not a loss. In our model, a bad 
outcome of an uncertain lottery is evaluated as 
a loss, but a fully expected premium payment is 
not evaluated as a loss. Loss aversion therefore 
generates  first-order  risk  aversion  toward  all 
insurable risks.
When a person makes a committed decision 
long before outcomes occur, she affects the ref-
erence point by her choice. For these situations, 
we introduce in Section IV the idea of a “choice-
acclimating personal equilibrium” (CPE), defined 
as  a  decision  that  maximizes  expected  utility 
given that it determines both the reference lottery 
and the outcome lottery. Except that we specify 
the reference point as a lottery’s full distribution 
rather than its certainty equivalent, this concept 
is similar to the disappointment-aversion models 
of Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), and 
Gul (1991). Like PPE, CPE predicts that the deci-
sion maker strongly prefers to insure expected 
risks. But there is also an important difference. 
In some situations, a person would be better off 
with the reduced uncertainty of expecting to buy 
expensive insurance than not expecting to do so, 
but always choosing to avoid the expense of insur-
ance at the last minute if not committed to buy-
ing it. Hence, the distaste for the risk manifests 
itself in behavior when the insurance decision is 
made up front, as in CPE, but not when the deci-
sion is made later, as in PPE. In such situations, 
environments where CPE is appropriate generate 
greater risk aversion and higher expected utility 
than environments where PPE applies.
The sensitivity of behavior to the economic 
environment  described  above  applies  only  to 
modest-scale choices, where risk attitudes are 
necessarily dominated by the gain-loss compo-
nent of preferences. In Section V, we investigate 
attitudes  toward  large-scale  risk,  where  con-
sumption utility cannot be assumed to be linear. 
We show that under reasonable conditions, the 
reference point has only a minor impact on how 
a person evaluates very large gambles. A person 
is therefore prone to exhibit risk aversion reflect-
ing diminishing marginal utility of wealth inde-
pendently of the environment.
Beyond helping to explain in a unified frame-
work  seemingly  contradictory  behavior,  we 
hope the endogenous specification of the refer-
ence point helps make our model readily por-
table to many settings. To facilitate applications, 
in  Appendix  A  we  present  an  array  of  risk-
  characterization concepts and results. In Section 
VI, we conclude the paper by discussing some 
of the shortcomings of our model, emphasizing 
especially its failure to capture important ways 
that  reference-dependent  risk  attitudes  reflect 
failures of full rationality.SEPTEMBER 2007 1050 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
I.  Reference-Dependent Utility
In  this  section  we  present  the  one-dimen-
sional version of the utility function in Ko ˝szegi 
and Rabin (2006). As is standard for models of 
risky  choice  outside  of  full-fledged  life-cycle 
consumption  models  in  macroeconomics,  our 
theory  takes  as  a  primitive  the  choice  set  of 
gambles a person focuses on, in isolation from 
other risks and choices she faces.
For a riskless wealth outcome w [ R and 
riskless reference level of wealth r [ R, utility is 
given by u1w|r2 ; m1w2 1 m1m1w2 2 m1r22.
2   
The term m1w2 is intrinsic “consumption util-
ity”  usually  assumed  relevant  in  economics, 
and the term m1m1w2 2 m1r22 is the reference-
dependent gain-loss utility. Our model assumes 
that how a person feels about gaining or los-
ing  relative  to  a  reference  point  depends  on 
the changes in consumption utility associated 
with such gains or losses. This separation and 
interdependence  of  economic  and  psychologi-
cal payoffs is analogous to assumptions made 
previously by Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden 
(1986), and Veronika Köbberling and Peter P. 
Wakker (2005).
To accommodate our assumption below that 
the reference point is beliefs about outcomes, we 
allow for the reference point to be a probability 
measure G over R:
(1)    u1wZg2 5 2 u1wZr2  dg1r2.
This formulation captures the notion that the 
evaluation of a wealth outcome is based on com-
paring it to all possibilities in the support of the 
2 Like many models, this paper assumes preferences are 
over  monetary  wealth  rather  than  consumption.  Strictly 
speaking, this means our model corresponds to a single-
period setting. While we have not verified how our results 
extend to a multiperiod consumption model, the shortcut 
of using wealth may be appropriate even in that case, both 
because  people  often  experience  sensations  of  gain  and 
loss directly from wealth changes, and because wealth is 
a summary statistic for consumption and hence may gen-
erate  similar  gain-loss  sensations.  As  a  person’s  wealth 
increases, for example, her anticipation of increased con-
sumption throughout the future is likely to generate a sense 
of gain similar to that presumed in our model. A developing 
body of research on dynamic models of reference-depen-
dent utility, such as Rebecca Stone (2005) and Ko ˝szegi and 
Rabin (2007), may help extend and explore the robustness 
of the results we develop in this paper.
reference lottery. For example, if the reference 
lottery is a gamble between $0 and $100, an out-
come of $50 evokes a mixture of two feelings, a 
gain relative to $0 and a loss relative to $100.
3
When w is drawn according to the probability 
measure F, utility is given by
(2)   u1FZg2 5 
2 2 
u1w|r)  dg1r2 dF1w2.
For simplicity and contrary to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) and its extensions, we assume 
that preferences are linear in probabilities. This 
means  that  our  model  will  get  some  predic-
tions—e.g.  regarding  insurance  of  low-prob-
ability losses—wrong.
Our utility function is closely related to that 
of Sugden (2003). In his model, outcome lotter-
ies are compared to reference lotteries state by 
state, capturing a form of state-contingent dis-
appointment missing from our theory.
4 Another 
alternative to our formulation, pursued by Bell 
(1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), Gul (1991), 
and Jonathan Shalev (2000), is to collapse the 
reference  lottery  into  some  type  of  certainty 
equivalent.
5  With  such  a  specification,  two 
3 More  than  saying  a  person  separately  compares  an 
outcome  to  all  components  of  the  reference  lottery,  our 
formulation of m[ below implies that losses relative to a 
stochastic reference point count more than gains, so that the 
$50 above yields negative gain-loss utility. An alternative 
specification is one where the relief of avoiding the $0 out-
come outweighs the disappointment of not getting the $100 
outcome. This alternative seems difficult to reconcile with 
loss aversion relative to riskless reference points. It would 
also seem to imply that people will seek to endow them-
selves with risks because the chance for a pleasant relief 
from getting better outcomes outweighs the potential disap-
pointment from getting bad outcomes.
4 While this state-contingency seems in some cases to be 
more realistic than our approach, and we do not know the 
extent to which the two models can be reconciled within 
a broader framework, our prediction of a state-indepen-
dent disappointment when receiving worse-than-expected 
outcomes seems pervasively realistic, and is missing from 
Sugden’s  approach.  In  addition,  Sugden’s  model  (unlike 
ours)  makes  the  implausible  prediction  that  a  person 
becomes very risk loving when given the option to replace 
the reference lottery with a riskless amount.
5 There is some suggestive evidence of mixed feelings 
when there are multiple counterfactuals relative to which 
outcomes can be evaluated. For instance, Jeff T. Larsen et al.   
(2004) find that when a subject receives $5 from a lottery 
that could have paid $5 or $9, she has both positive and 
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  reference lotteries that have the same certainty 
equivalent generate the same risk preferences. 
This is inconsistent with our theory’s prediction 
that a person is more inclined to accept a risk if 
she had been expecting risk, a prediction that 
seems broadly correct based on the little avail-
able evidence. But as we discuss below, the main 
difference between all these models and ours is 
in the specification of the reference point.
We assume m satisfies the following properties:
  A0.  m1x2 is continuous for all x, twice dif-
ferentiable for x 2 0, and m102 5 0.
 A1.  m1x2 is strictly increasing.
  A2.  If y . x $ 0, then m1y2 1 m12y2 , m1x2 
1 m12x2.
  A3.  ms1x2 # 0  for  x . 0  and  ms1x2 $ 0  for 
x , 0.
  A4.  m9 –102/m9 1102  K  l  .  1,  where  m9 1102  K   
limxS0 m91|x|2 and m9 –102 K limxS0 m912|x|2.
Properties  A0–A4,  first  stated  by  David 
Bowman, Deborah Minehart, and Rabin (1999), 
correspond to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
explicit  or  implicit  assumptions  about  their 
“value function” defined on w 2 r. Loss aver-
sion is captured by A2 for large stakes and A4 
for small stakes, and diminishing sensitivity is 
captured by A3. While the inequalities in A3 are 
most realistically considered strict, to charac-
terize the implications of loss aversion without 
diminishing sensitivity as a force on behavior, 
we define a subcase of A3:
A3r.  For all x 2 0,  ms1x2 5 0.
When we apply A39 below, we will param-
eterize m as m9 1102 5 h and m9 –102 5 lh . h, so 
that h can be interpreted as the weight attached 
to gain-loss utility.
To  determine  behavior,  the  utility  function 
introduced  above  needs  to  be  combined  with 
a theory of reference-point determination. As 
a disciplined and largely realistic first pass, we 
winning $9, respectively. Losing $5 when it is also possible 
to lose $9 evokes similar mixed feelings.
assume  that  a  person’s  reference  point  is  the 
rational  expectations  about  the  relevant  out-
come she held between the time she first focused 
on the outcome and shortly before it occurs. For 
example, if an employee had been expecting a 
salary of $100,000, she would assess a salary 
of $90,000, not as a large gain relative to her 
status quo wealth, but as a loss relative to her 
expectations of wealth.
6 As we explain in detail 
in Ko ˝szegi and Rabin (2006), our primary moti-
vation  for  equating  the  reference  point  with 
expectations is that this assumption helps unify 
and  reconcile  existing  intuitions  and  discus-
sions.  We  assume  rational  expectations  both 
to  maintain  modelling  discipline  (much  like 
in  other  rational-expectations  theories),  and 
because we feel in most situations people have 
some ability to predict their own environment 
and behavior. Unfortunately, relatively little evi-
dence on the determinants of reference points 
currently exists. Some existing evidence does, 
however, provide empirical support for expec-
tations as a component of the reference point. 
In analyzing play in the huge-stakes game show 
“Deal or No Deal,” for example, Thierry Post et 
al. (forthcoming) find evidence that past expec-
tations affect behavior. In the game, a contestant 
“owns” a suitcase with a randomly determined 
prize. Gradually, the contestant learns informa-
tion about the prize in her bag (by opening other 
bags and learning what is not in her bag). At 
each stage, a “bank” offers a riskless amount of 
money to replace the amount in the bag. A con-
testant’s acceptance or rejection of the offer is 
an indication of her risk aversion. A key finding 
is that contestants reject better offers when they 
have received bad news in the last few rounds, 
suggesting that they are less risk averse in these 
contingencies.
7
6 Our theory posits that preferences depend on lagged 
expectations, rather than on expectations contemporaneous 
with the time of consumption. This does not assume that 
beliefs are slow to adjust to new information or that people 
are unaware of the choices they have just made—but that 
preferences do not instantaneously change when beliefs do. 
When somebody finds out five minutes ahead of time that 
she will for sure not receive a long-expected $100, she pre-
sumably immediately adjusts her expectations to the new 
situation, but five minutes later she will still assess not get-
ting the money as a loss.
7  For  further  examples  of  evidence  of  expectations-
based  counterfactuals  affecting  reactions  to  outcomes, SEPTEMBER 2007 1052 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Many researchers have noted over the years 
that the reference point may to some extent be 
influenced by expectations. But most previous 
formal models either equate the reference point 
with the status quo, or leave it unspecified, and 
none explicitly equates it to recent beliefs about 
outcomes.  To  our  knowledge,  the  disappoint-
ment-aversion models by Bell (1985), Loomes 
and Sugden (1986), and Gul (1991), come closest 
to saying that the reference point is recent expec-
tations.
8 But because these models assume the 
reference point is formed after choice, they treat 
surprise situations differently from our theory, 
predicting in particular first-order risk aversion 
for surprise losses. Our model can be thought 
of in part as unifying prospect theory and dis-
appointment-aversion theory in one framework, 
while also proposing a solution concept (PPE) 
for situations where choices are anticipated but 
not committed to in advance. We are not aware 
of any model that attempts such a unification.
Although our model is in the tradition of most 
of economics in that it posits a utility function 
with  certain  properties,  it  differs  from  much 
of the foundational literature on choice under 
uncertainty in that it does not derive the utility 
function from axioms capturing those properties. 
It also differs from most economic theories in 
making explicit how utility depends on a mental 
state—beliefs—that is not directly observable 
in choice behavior. Obviously, neither of these 
features means that our model does not have 
observable or falsifiable implications. Indeed, in 
Appendix B we show how to extract the full util-
ity function 1m1 # 2 and m1 # 22 from behavior in 
a limited set of decision problems, and because 
our model provides a complete mapping from 
decision problems to possible choices, this com-
pletely ties down predictions for all other deci-
sion problems. And the many propositions in the 
paper derive general restrictions that our model 
implies for observed behavior.
see Victoria Husted Medvec, Scott F. Madey, and Thomas 
Gilovich (1995), Barbara Mellers, Alan Schwartz, and Ilana 
Ritov (1999), and Hans C. Breiter et al. (2001).
8 In addition, the notion of “loss-aversion equilibrium” 
that  Shalev  (2000)  proposed  for  multiplayer  games  can 
be interpreted as saying that each player’s reference point 
is expectations. As we discuss below, rewriting Shalev’s 
model using our specification of stochastic reference points 
and applying it to individual decision making corresponds 
to the UPE solution concept.
II.  Risk Attitudes in Surprise Situations
In the next three sections, we investigate the 
decision maker’s attitudes toward modest-scale 
risk, such as $100 or $1,000, where consump-
tion utility can be taken to be approximately 
linear—and where we therefore derive formal 
results under the assumption that m1w2 5 w.
9 In 
Section V, we return to an exploration of large-
scale risk, where risk preferences can be sub-
stantially influenced by diminishing marginal 
utility  of  wealth.  We  organize  our  results  on 
modest-scale  risk  into  three  sections  accord-
ing to the expectational environment the deci-
sion maker faces, considering in turn “surprise,” 
PPE,  and  CPE  situations.  But  a  number  of 
themes link the three sections. Propositions 1, 
2, 5, and 6 identify common ways in which the 
decision maker becomes less risk averse if she 
had been expecting, or is now facing, more risk. 
Proposition 3 shows that a person is first-order 
risk averse when she anticipates a risk as well 
as the possibility to insure it. And Propositions 
4, 7, and 8 show that the more a risk can be pre-
pared for, the greater is the risk aversion dis-
played in behavior: the person’s risk aversion is 
greater when she expects an insurance decision 
than when she does not, and even greater when 
she can commit early to purchasing insurance.
This section begins the analysis with risk-tak-
ing behavior when the reference point is fixed, 
considering  both  deterministic  and  stochastic 
reference  points.  The  analysis  is  the  limiting 
case of UPE/PPE behavior when the decision 
maker finds herself in an ex ante low-probabil-
ity situation, so that she has fixed expectations 
formed essentially independently of the relevant 
choice set.
9 If m[ were not linear (but remained differentiable), 
some  of  our  results  would  survive  unchanged,  and  the 
others  could  be  modified  by  restating  them  in  terms  of 
expected consumption utilities instead of expected values. 
But  because  this  would  complicate  our  statements,  and 
because consumption utility is so close to linear for mod-
est stakes, we assume m[ is linear. To give a sense of the 
calibrational appropriateness of this approximation, note 
that even for a person who has a low $1 million in lifetime 
wealth and a very high consumption-utility coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of 10, winning or losing $1,000 (a dif-
ference of $2,000 in wealth) changes marginal consump-
tion utility by only 1.8 percent.VOL. 97 NO. 4 1053 KO �SzEgI ANd RABIN: REFERENCE-dEPENdENT RISK ATTITudES
Proposition 2 of Ko ˝szegi and Rabin (2006) 
shows  that  when  the  decision  maker  expects 
to keep the status quo, her behavior is identical 
to that predicted by prospect theory modified 
to  equate  decision  weights  with  probabilities. 
Hence, our model is consistent with much of 
the  evidence  motivating  status  quo  prospect 
theory.  It  can  also  be  used  to  interpret  the 
“disposition  effect”  found  by  Odean  (1998) 
for stocks and Genesove and Mayer (2001) for 
houses—whereby people appear disproportion-
ately reluctant to sell an asset for less than they 
paid.
10 The intuition commonly invoked for the 
disposition effect, formalized by Gomes (2005) 
in a version of prospect theory based on the 
lagged status quo, is that because the purchase 
price operates as a reference point for the sell-
ing price, people will be risk-seeking in waiting 
for a price to recover before selling.
11 While our 
model cannot explain all aspects of the disposi-
tion effect, by basing the reference point on the 
expected resale price, it does help to determine 
when and how the effect is likely to be observed. 
Because home and stock owners usually expect 
to make money, they will be risk loving when 
these investments unexpectedly lose money. But 
when a person foresees a good chance of losing 
some money—for example, when investing in a 
highly risky stock—she will be less willing to 
take chances to break even. And if she expects 
an investment—such as a house in a booming 
market or inventory a merchant expects to resell 
at  a  large  margin—to  make  a  large  positive 
return, she may even be reluctant to sell at prices 
insufficiently above the purchase price.
While our model only replicates or qualifies 
classical prospect theory in the settings above, 
10 The disposition effect is closely related to the “break-
even  effect”  coined  by  Thaler  and  Johnson  (1990)  for 
monetary gambles. They predicted that following losses, 
gambles that offer a chance to break even become espe-
cially attractive.
11 Barberis and Wei Xiong (2006) show that prospect 
theory based on the lagged status quo does not necessarily 
imply an increased risk lovingness after losses. Intuitively, 
for risks a person takes on voluntarily, losses are typically 
smaller than gains. Hence, a person is typically closer to 
the reference point after a loss than after a gain, and due 
to loss aversion this can mean greater aversion to substan-
tial amounts of risk. In the Odean (1998) and Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) studies, however, individuals can take more 
incremental risk—waiting more or less exactly until the 
price returns to the reference point.
it makes a set of novel predictions regarding the 
effect of prior uncertainty on behavior, identi-
fying senses in which the expectation of risk 
decreases aversion to the expected as well as 
additional risks. To state these results, we use 
H 1 Hr to denote the distribution of the sum of 
independent draws from the distributions H and 
H9. (Thus, 1H 1 H921z2 5 1  H1z 2 s2  dH91s2.) 
When it creates no confusion, a real number will 
denote both a deterministic wealth level and the 
lottery that assigns probability 1 to that amount 
of wealth. Proposition 1 says that under A3r, a 
person is no more willing to accept a given lot-
tery if it is added to a riskless reference point 
than if it is added to a lottery and/or evaluated 
relative to a risky reference point.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose m1 # 2 is linear and 
m1 # 2 satisfies A39. For any lotteries F, G, and 
H and constant w, if U1w 1 F0w2 $ U1w0w2, 
then U1H 1 F0G2 $ U1H0G2.
Since m1 # 2 is linear and A39 is satisfied, a 
small change in an outcome is evaluated solely 
according to the previously expected probabili-
ties of getting higher and lower outcomes, and 
not according to the distance from those higher 
and lower outcomes. Now when F is added to a 
riskless reference point w, positive outcomes of 
F are assessed as pure gains, and negative out-
comes of F are assessed as pure losses. But when 
F is instead added to a lottery H and is evaluated 
relative to a lottery G, positive outcomes of F 
partially eliminate losses suffered from H rela-
tive to G, and are hence evaluated more favor-
ably than pure gains; and negative outcomes of 
F in part merely eliminate gains from H relative 
to G, and are hence evaluated less unfavorably 
than  pure  losses.  For  both  these  reasons,  the 
decision maker is more willing to accept F.
An important implication of Proposition 1—
obtained by setting H 5 w  and g 5 F —is a type 
of endowment effect for risk: a person is less risk 
averse in eliminating a risk she expected to face 
than in taking on the same risk if she did not 
expect it. This prediction of our model contrasts 
with previous theories of reference-dependent 
utility with which we are familiar. While little 
evidence  on  the  issue  seems  to  be  available, 
choice experiments by Jack L. Knetsch and J. 
A. Sinden (1984) and evidence on hypothetical 
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indicate that people tend to be less risk averse 
when selling a lottery they are endowed with 
than when buying the lottery.
A  second  way  in  which  expecting  risk 
decreases  risk  aversion  is  that  a  person  is 
approximately risk neutral in accepting a lottery 
that is “small” relative to the reference lottery.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose m[ is linear. For 
any lottery F with positive expected value:
 (i)  There exist A, e . 0 such that if the lot-
tery G satisfies Prg[r [ 1k 2 A, k 1 A2] , 
e for all constants k, then u1H 1 F Z g2 . 
u1H Z g2 . u1H 2 F Z g2 for any lottery H.
  (ii)  For  any  continuously  distributed  lottery 
G, there is a t { . 0 such that for any t [  
10, t { 4 and any lottery H, u1H 1 t ? FZg2 . 
u1HZg2 . u1H 2 t ? FZg2.
The  proposition  identifies  attitudes  toward 
a given lottery F with positive expected value, 
showing ways in which the decision maker is risk   
neutral when evaluating multiples of F. Part 1 
says that if the reference lottery is sufficiently 
widely distributed, the decision maker will take   
F and reject 2F. Part 2 says that fixing a con-
tinuously distributed reference lottery, she will 
take a sufficiently small multiple of F and reject 
the same multiple of 2F. Intuitively, if the extra 
lottery is small relative to the reference lottery 
g, it is unlikely to turn a gain or loss relative 
to g into the opposite, and there is little dimin-
ishing sensitivity over its range. Hence, neither 
loss aversion nor diminishing sensitivity plays a 
major role in its evaluation.
Part 2 of Proposition 2 is related to Proposi-
tion 1 in Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) 
showing that a loss-averse (in their terminology 
“first-order risk-averse”) decision maker is only 
second-order risk averse if she faces background 
risk.  In  addition,  Proposition  2  demonstrates 
that even if a person now faces no background 
risk (H is riskless), the mere prior expectation of 
risk makes her second-order risk averse.
Crucially for a number of later results, Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 do not imply that a person is 
unbothered by risk she expects or faces, even 
if it does make her less risk averse. In fact, the 
same  force  that  decreases  risk  aversion  also 
decreases  expected  utility:  when  the  decision 
maker  had  been  expecting  risk  or  is  already 
facing risk, she is already exposed to stochastic 
utility-decreasing sensations of loss, so taking 
additional risk does not add so much exposure 
to losses.
To  illustrate  immediate  and  later  points, 
Table 1 shows some of our model’s implications 
in a parameterized example with consumption 
utility m1w2 5 10,000 ln 1w2, and gain-loss util-
ity m1x2 5 !x for x $ 0 and m1x2 5 23!2x 
for x # 0.
12 We consider three fifty-fifty gambles 
of different scales. Rows correspond to environ-
ments in which the gambles might be evaluated. 
For each gamble, the first column identifies the 
premium the decision maker is willing to pay 
for insurance against the risk in each environ-
ment, calculated as the difference between the 
gamble’s mean and its certainty equivalent. The 
second column gives the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion r ~ that would be inferred from the 
gamble’s  certainty  equivalent  if  one  assumed 
reference-independent CRRA utility.
Gamble I is a small-stakes gamble that pays 
either $1,000,100 or $999,900. The first panel 
of the table considers surprise situations with 
various (exogenous) expectations. The decision 
maker displays extreme risk lovingness if the 
gamble is a small loss relative to expectations, 
and extreme risk aversion if it is a small gain or 
involves both a loss and a gain. Although loss 
aversion  is  a  stronger  force  than  diminishing 
sensitivity,  the  decision  maker  displays  more 
risk aversion for gains than for mixed gambles 
because in the latter case she evaluates the cer-
tainty equivalent as a loss.
13 And as Propositions 1   
and  2  predict,  the  prior  expectation  of  risk 
decreases risk aversion, with expected risk on 
the order of $1,000 or $10,000 already lowering 
12 Note that, unless A39 holds, our model is not invariant 
to affine transformations of m[, so the appropriate speci-
fication of m[ and m[ involves a substantive assumption 
about  their  relative  scaling.  This  scaling  amounts  to  an 
assumption about the speed of diminishing sensitivity in 
gain-loss utility. Indeed, the choice to specify our example 
with m(w2 5 10,000ln(w2 is designed to get gain-loss utility 
to dominate for an appropriate range of small stakes, and 
consumption utility to dominate for an appropriate range 
of large stakes.
13 Indeed,  while  not  shown  in  the  table,  the  riskless 
reference point that makes the person indifferent between 
the reference point and the gamble—a situation where the 
insurance premium is not evaluated as a loss—corresponds 
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the  decision  maker’s  willingness  to  pay  for 
insurance to essentially zero.
III.  UPE and PPE Risk Attitudes
While the previous section considered risk 
attitudes  in  surprise  situations,  our  primary 
interest is in behavior when the decision maker 
correctly predicts the choice set she faces. From 
the psychological hypothesis that the reference 
point for evaluating outcomes is equal to lagged 
rational beliefs about those outcomes, we develop 
two reduced-form models that differ in when 
the decision maker makes a committed choice. 
In this section, we analyze her behavior in one 
extreme  possibility,  when  she  anticipates  the 
decision she faces but cannot commit to a choice 
until shortly before the outcome. Although our 
model is ambiguous as to the interpretation of 
“shortly  before,”  insurance  choices  on  short-
term rentals such as cars or skis probably best 
correspond to such a case. The resulting model 
is equivalent to the one-dimensional version of 
the model in Ko ˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
Suppose the decision maker has probabilis-
tic  beliefs  over  possible  compact  choice  sets 
described by {d1, 1 2 q; d2, q}, where choice 
sets  d1,  d2  (  D  1R2  occur  with  probabilities 
1 2 q and q, respectively. All of our results in 
the next two sections are for the case q 5 0, so 
that the decision maker knows the single choice 
set she will face. But we keep our definition a 
little  more  general  because—as  we  explain 
below—this allows us to capture the kinds of 
surprise situations discussed in the previous sec-
tion as limiting cases of low-probability choice 
sets.
Since the person makes her decision shortly 
before the outcome resulting from it, at that time 
the beliefs determining the reference point are 
past and hence unchangeable. This means that 
she maximizes utility taking the reference point 
as given, so that she can rationally expect to fol-
low a plan of behavior only if she is willing to 
Table 1—Attitudes toward Three 50250 Gambles
  Gamble I Gamble II Gamble III
$999,900/$1,000,100 $990,000/$1,010,000 $500,000/$1,500,000
WTP r ~ WTP r ~ WTP r ~
Surprise with different (fixed) expectations
$500,000 $0.01 1.01 $50 1.01 $135,840 1.02
$990,000 0.02 3.4 329 6.5 132,477 0.99
$999,900 19.2 3,936 469 9.4 132,248 0.99
$1,000,000 9.17 1,844 432 8.6 132,246 0.99
$1,000,100 233.1 27,171 397 7.9 132,244 0.99
$1,010,000 2,0.01 25.6 2712 214 132,028 0.99
$1,500,000 ,0.01 0.97 49 0.97 128,429 0.96
u[$999,900, $1,000, 100] 3.66 733 433 8.7 132,246 0.99
u[$999,000, $1,001,000] 0.27 52 507 10.2 132,246 0.99
u[$990,000, $1, 010, 000] 0.02 3.5 275 5.5 132,248 0.99
PPE with different amounts of background risk
none $48.0 11,389 $757 15 $138,502 1.04
u[2$100, $100] 8.54 1,717 779 14 138,467 1.04
u[2$1,000, $1,000] 0.56 111 656 13 138,394 1.03
u[2$10,000, $10,000] 0.03 6.0 259 4.7 138,176 1.03
CPE with different amounts of background risk
none $71.0 23,348 $757 15 $138,502 1.04
u[2$100, $100] 28.5 6,041 779 14 138,467 1.04
u[2$1,000, $1,000] 1.84 368 656 13 138,394 1.03
u[2$10,000, $10,000]  0.07 14 362 7.2 138,176 1.03
Notes: The table assumes a consumption utility of m1w2 5 10, 000 ln1w2 and a gain-loss utility of m1x2 5 !x for x $ 0 and 
m1x2 5 23!       2 x for x , 0. For each gamble and environment, we calculated the gamble’s certainty equivalent in that envi-
ronment. WTP is the difference between the gamble’s mean ($1,000,000 in each case) and the certainty equivalent. This is 
the premium the decision maker is willing to pay for insurance. r ~ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion that would be 
inferred from the gamble’s certainty equivalent if one assumed reference-independent CRRA utility. u[x, y] refers to a dis-
crete uniform distribution between x and y, with atoms on multiples of $50.SEPTEMBER 2007 1056 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
follow it given a reference point generated by the 
expectation to do so.
DEFINITION 1:  A selection F1 [ D1,  F2 [ D2 
is  an  unacclimating  personal  equilibrium 
1uPE) if for each l [ 1,  2 and any F9 l  [ dl, 
u 1Fl|11 2 q2F1 1 qF22 $ u 1F9 l |11 2 q2F1 1 
qF22.
14
If  the  person  expects  to  choose  F1  and  F2 
from choice sets D1 and D2, respectively, then 
given  her  expectations  over  possible  choice 
sets, she expects the distribution of outcomes 
11 2 q2F1 1 qF2. Definition 1 states that with 
those expectations as her reference point, she 
should indeed be willing to choose F1 and F2 
from choice sets D1 and D2.
UPE is closely related to the notion of “loss-
aversion equilibrium” that Shalev (2000) defined 
for multiplayer games as a Nash equilibrium fix-
ing each player’s reference point, where the ref-
erence point is equal to the player’s (implicitly 
defined)  reference-dependent  expected  utility. 
Although Shalev does not himself pursue this 
direction, reformulating his notion of loss-aver-
sion equilibrium using our utility function and 
applying it to individual decision making cor-
responds to UPE.
In the decision between a fifty-fifty chance 
of having to pay $100 out of current wealth w 
and buying insurance for $55, when is choosing 
the lottery a UPE? If the lottery is the reference 
point, the following inequality indicates when it 
is preferred to paying $55:
(3)   c
1
2










 m1 2 1002d 
      $ [w 2 55]






 m1 2 552d.
14 Because each of our solution concepts is an example 
of personal equilibrium as first defined in Ko ˝szegi (2005), 
Theorem 1 of that paper implies that when 11 2 q2d1 1 
qd2 is convex and compact, UPE, as well as PPE and CPE, 
exist.
There can be multiple UPE in a given situa-
tion—there can be multiple self-fulfilling expec-
tations—and  generically  different  UPE  yield 
different  expected  utilities.  But  the  person’s 
expectations are based on her own plans on what 
to choose once the time comes. It seems likely, 
therefore, that she will choose the best plan she 
knows she will follow through on.
DEFINITION 2: A selection F1 [ D1,  F2 [ D2 
is a preferred personal equilibrium 1PPE) if it is 
a uPE, and u 111 2 q2F1 1 qF2|112q2 F1 1 q 
F22 $ u 111 2 q2F9 1 1 q F9 2 Z112q2 F9 1 1 q F9 22 for 
all uPE selections F9 l  [ d1, F9 2 [ d2.
A major feature of UPE and PPE is the con-
straint that choice must be optimal given expec-
tations at the time. This means that the decision 
maker does not internalize the effect of her choice 
on expectations, so—as we will illustrate—she 
often does not maximize ex ante expected utility 
among the choices available to her.
To  begin  our  analysis  of  UPE  and  PPE 
behavior, we note that the results in Section II 
on expectations fixed independently of the per-
son’s choice set D1 can be thought of as apply-
ing UPE or PPE to situations where that choice 
set is a surprise: if she had been expecting to 
face choice set D2 with near certainty and D1 
with  very  small  probability,  and  to  choose 
F [ D2 (perhaps because d2 5 {F}, so that she 
thought she would have no choice), her refer-
ence point would be approximately F indepen-
dently of D1 or what she had been expecting to 
choose from D1.
To study decisions for choice situations that 
are anticipated, we first establish that a person 
has a strong preference to insure modest-scale 
risks—she is first-order risk averse—and then 
show that expecting risk at the start decreases 
her aversion to additional risk.
PROPOSITION  3:  Suppose  m[  is  linear. 
For any w [ R and mean-zero lottery F ? 0   
with bounded support, there exist k { , t { . 0 such 
that  for  any  positive  t , t,  k , k { ,  the  unique 
PPE with the choice set {w, w 1 t1F 1 k2} is 
to choose w.
Proposition 3 states that a person will choose 
a riskless w over a sufficiently small multiple 
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sensitivity and create aversion to risk. But even 
for these decisions, the extent of risk aversion 
often seems quantitatively much stronger than 
predicted  by  prospect  theory.  A  calibrational 
problem  is  immediately  apparent  in  intuitive 
terms if we pose the deductible choices of hom-
eowners analyzed by Justin Sydnor (2006) as 
gambles relative to the status quo. For the aver-
age consumer with a $500 deductible, the pre-
mium for a $1,000 deductible is about $600, and 
the premium for a $500 deductible is about $100 
higher. The probability of making a claim in any 
given year is 0.05. Hence, the choice between 
the two deductibles is equivalent to the choice 
between the gambles (2600, 0.95; 21600, 0.05) 
and (2700, 0.95; 21200, 0.05).
17 We conjecture 
that when asked in these terms, most individu-
als would choose the former gamble, and indeed 
Sydnor (2006) shows that typical parameteriza-
tions of prospect theory make the same predic-
tion. Yet the majority of consumers in his dataset 
chose the latter gamble.
But the difference between anticipated and 
surprise  situations  extends  beyond  attitudes 
toward losses. As indicated in the second panel 
of Table 1, the certainty equivalent for Gamble I   
in our example is lower in a PPE situation with 
no  background  risk  than  in  any  of  the  sur-
prise situations. Indeed, if a person is deciding 
between taking on a risk and fully insuring it, 
under A3
r she is at least as risk averse in PPE 
as in a surprise situation, whatever her expecta-
tions may have been in the latter case.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose m[ is linear and 
m[  satisfies  A39.  If  w  1  F  is  a  PPE  in  the 
choice set {w,w 1 F}, then for any lottery H, 
U1w 1 F0H2 . U1w0H2.
Because  of  the  many  ways  it  predicts  that 
behavior in surprise situations differs from that in 
expected situations, our theory cautions against 
extrapolating  from  experimental  results  too 
casually. Insofar as most experimental subjects 
do not have a clear idea about the tasks they are 
going to face, their behavior does not correspond 
to what they would do in a similar but expected 
17 Strictly speaking, the two situations are not equivalent 
if some claims are between $500 and $1,000. But if so, a 
high deductible is all the more attractive.
bet.
15 Intuitively, w is a UPE because when the 
decision maker expects it, loss aversion leads 
her to turn down the gamble. And w is a PPE 
because the gamble exposes the decision maker 
to a sense of loss from bad outcomes that out-
weighs the sense of gain from good outcomes, 
and hence yields lower expected utility than w.
In predicting attitudes toward insuring mod-
erate  and  high-probability  losses,  status  quo 
prospect theory says both that loss aversion does 
not play a role, and that diminishing sensitivity 
pushes people toward not insuring. When it comes 
to insuring expected losses, our model reverses 
this prediction: it says that loss aversion plays the 
crucial role and pushes people toward insuring. 
As a key force behind this prediction, our model 
captures  an  intuition  regarding  the  difference 
between “costs” and “losses” that has sometimes 
been articulated (e.g., in Kahneman and Tversky 
1984  and  Nathan  Novemsky  and  Kahneman 
2005), but has not been formalized. In our model, 
beliefs about wealth take into account a planned 
premium payment, so that such a payment is not 
evaluated as a loss. By contrast, whether or not 
a person had expected to buy insurance, a bad 
realization of a stochastic lottery is evaluated as 
a loss. Because loss aversion therefore plays a 
central role in the decision of whether to insure, 
first-order  risk  aversion  results.  Indeed,  some 
consumers’ purchase of insurance against high-
probability losses—such as extremely expensive 
automobile service contracts—seems consistent 
with this prediction and is in direct contrast to 
status quo prospect theory.
16
For low-probability losses—such as those cov-
ered by extended warranties and low deductibles 
on homeowners’ insurance—the overweighting 
of low probabilities in conventional status quo 
prospect  theory  can  counteract  diminishing 
15 Proposition 11 in Appendix A identifies a precise con-
dition of the attractiveness of a vanishingly small lottery 
that  determines  whether  the  decision  maker  accepts  the 
lottery.
16  An  experiment  by  Antoni  Bosch-Domènech  and 
Joaquim Silvestre (2006) can also be interpreted as provid-
ing evidence for risk aversion in high-probability losses. 
Subjects received money for their performance in the first 
session of the experiment, and were asked to come back 
weeks later for a second session. Subjects were warned that 
they could lose money during the second session. In this 
session, a majority of students were risk averse for both 
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situation in real life. Specifically, Proposition 4 
says that laboratory measurements of small-scale 
risk aversion will often underestimate risk aver-
sion for expected small-scale risks.
We  conclude  this  section  with  results  on 
two ways in which expecting risk at the start 
decreases aversion to additional risk. Although 
our formal results identify the effect of facing 
a lottery G the decision maker cannot avoid, 
this can be the reduced-form representation of a 
situation where she could, but (because it is too 
attractive) in equilibrium does not avoid g. First, 
the decision maker is no less likely to accept a 
given lottery if she is already facing risk than if 
she is not.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose m1 # 2 is linear and 
m1 # 2 satisfies A39. For any lotteries g and F   
and constant w, if choosing G is a uPE with the 
choice set {g,g 1 F}, then choosing w is a PPE 
with the choice set {w, w 1 F}.
And as a corollary to Proposition 2, a person 
is neutral to risks that are small relative to the 
risk she is already expecting.
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose m[ is linear. For 
any lottery F with positive expected value:
(i) There exist A, e . 0  such that for any 
lottery G for which Prg1r [ [k 2 A, k 1 A]2 
, e for all constants k, the unique uPE with 
the decision set {g,g 1 F} is to choose g 1 
F, and the unique uPE with the decision set 
{g, g 2 F} is to choose g.
(ii) For any continuously distributed lottery 
g, there is a t { . 0 such that for any t [ 10, t {], 
the unique uPE with the decision set {g, g 1 
t ? F} is to choose g 1 t ? F, and the unique 
uPE with the decision set {g, g 2 t ? F} is to 
choose G.
The second panel of Table 1 quantifies Proposi-
tions  5  and  6  for  our  parameterized  example, 
showing that the decision maker approaches risk 
neutrality for Gamble I even for relatively limited 
amounts  of  background  risk.  An  unavoidable 
risk on the order of a mere $100 decreases the 
premium she is willing to pay for insurance from 
$48 to $9, and unavoidable risk on the order of 
$1,000 makes her virtually risk neutral.
IV.  CPE Risk Attitudes
Beyond the distinction between surprise and 
anticipated  exposure  to  risky  decisions,  our 
underlying assumptions also imply differences 
in attitudes toward anticipated risks as a func-
tion of how far in advance decisions are com-
mitted  to.  We  now  analyze  risk  preferences 
regarding outcomes that are resolved long after 
all decisions are committed to, a situation that 
applies to most insurance choices. In this case, 
the expectations relative to which a decision’s 
outcomes are evaluated are formed after—and 
therefore incorporate the implications of—the 
decision.
DEFINITION 3: For any choice set D, F [ D 
is  a  choice-acclimating  personal  equilibrium 
1CPE) if u 1FZF) $ u 1F9ZF9) for all Fr [ D.
If the decision maker makes the choice F [ D 
today, this will determine her reference point by 
the  time  the  relevant  wealth  outcome  occurs. 
Thus,  when  evaluating  her  resulting  expected 
utility, both the reference and outcome lotteries 
are equal to F. Note that CPE can naturally be 
extended to decisions where some uncertainty 
is  resolved  today.  In  this  case,  immediately 
resolved uncertainty gets absorbed into the ref-
erence point, so that the decision maker maxi-
mizes  the  expectation  of  U1F0F2  taken  over 
the possible lotteries F that capture solely the 
remaining uncertainty. Hence, for instance, if 
somebody is confronted with a choice between 
getting $10,000 for certain a month later and 
getting $25,000 a month later if an immediately 
observed coin flip comes up heads, we predict 
she would evaluate her options solely in terms 
of expected consumption utility.
Our notion of CPE is related to the models 
of “disappointment aversion” of Bell (1985), 
Loomes  and  Sugden  (1986),  and  Gul  (1991),   
where outcomes are also evaluated relative to a 
reference lottery that is identical to the chosen 
lottery. As we have mentioned, however, these 
theories differ from ours in two important ways. 
They assume that a person evaluates outcomes 
relative  to  the  reference  lottery’s  certainty 
equivalent instead of the full distribution. And 
because they do not distinguish expectational 
environments at all, they do not share many of 
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are incorporated into the reference point, so that 
it may be unclear whether a person’s commit-
ted decision is made sufficiently early that CPE 
rather than PPE is appropriate for modeling her 
behavior. In many situations, this will not be a 
major problem, as the appropriate concept will 
be intuitively clear. In addition, because the two 
concepts generate distinctive behavior, observed 
choices can also be used to determine which 
concept applies.
19
As the proofs in Appendix C establish, Prop-
ositions 3 through 6 derived above for PPE also 
apply to CPE. Because anticipated risk exposes 
the decision maker to sensations of loss, she is 
first-order  risk  averse.  Furthermore,  expecting 
risk reduces her aversion to additional risk. This 
latter result follows partly from the force behind 
our analogous results above, that, when expect-
ing and facing stochastic losses to start with, 
taking further risk does not increase exposure to 
losses as much. When a person chooses both her 
reference and outcome lotteries, there is an addi-
tional, parallel force acting in the same direc-
tion: when expecting and facing stochastic losses 
to start with, the expectation of further risk does 
not increase exposure to losses as much.
Despite these similarities, CPE is consistent 
with  risk  aversion  that  is  qualitatively  differ-
ent,  not  only  from  standard  expected-utility-
over-wealth  models  and  prospect  theory,  but 
also  from  the  predictions  of  UPE,  PPE,  and 
any model where the reference point is taken 
as given at the moment of choice. Whereas in 
these  models  people  never  choose  stochasti-
cally dominated options, they might do so in 
CPE.  To  illustrate  this  possibility,  suppose  m 
satisfies A3
r, and consider a lottery F that yields 
w 1 g . w with probability p $ 0 and w with 
probability 1 2 p. Then u1w 1 FZw 1 F2 5 
[p1w 1 g2 1 11 2 p2w] 1 [p11 2 p2m1g2 1 
p11 2 p2m12 g2] 5 w 1 pg[1 2 11 2 p2h1l 2 
12]. If h1l 2 12 . 1, which is a calibrationally 
19 For instance, suppose F1 is a small binary lottery that 
generates barely enough gains for w 1 F1 to be chosen 
from {w, w 1 F1}, and let F2 be a different small binary 
lottery with the same property. Let F be a mixture of F1 
and F2 with equal weights. Since in PPE the reference point 
is fixed at the moment of choice, it is easy to show that in 
PPE the person would choose w 1 F from {w, w 1 F}. But 
since in CPE a person influences the reference point by her 
choice, and she dislikes risky reference points, in CPE she 
would choose w from {w, w 1 F}.
Returning  to  our  example  of  choosing 
between a 50 percent chance of losing $100 and 
insuring this risk for $55, selecting the lottery 














 m1 2 1002d 
  $ [w 2 55] 1[0].
The difference between UPE and CPE is in 
the right-hand sides of inequalities (3) and (4), 
which  capture  the  decision  maker’s  expected 
utilities  when  deviating  from  the  purported 
UPE and CPE, respectively. In UPE, the refer-
ence point does not adjust to the deviation, so 
paying $55 is assessed partly as a loss of $55 and 
partly as a gain of $45. In CPE, the reference 
point does adjust to the deviation, so there is no 
sensation of gain or loss when paying the $55.
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As with PPE, except in knife-edge cases there 
will be a unique CPE. But unlike in PPE, where 
the decision maker can choose her favorite plan 
only from those that she would follow through 
on, in CPE she can commit to her overall favor-
ite lottery. Hence, there cannot be a divergence 
between behavior and welfare.
It bears emphasizing that UPE/PPE and CPE 
are not different theories of what outcomes peo-
ple prefer. Indeed, in our example the expected 
utility from choosing the lottery (the left-hand 
side of inequality (3) or (4)) is independent of 
whether  the  choice  is  determined  by  UPE  or 
CPE. Rather than reflecting different notions of 
reference-dependent utility, the two concepts are 
motivated by the same theory of preference, as 
manifested differently depending on whether the 
person can commit to her choice ahead of time. 
Of course, one weakness of our theory is that it 
does not specify the lag with which new beliefs 
18  CPE  implicitly  assumes  that  the  decision  maker 
maximizes the expected future sensations generated once 
a  reference  point  determined  by  the  decision  is  formed 
and outcomes are resolved. As we discuss in the conclu-
sion, a person may not appreciate how her decision will 
affect future sensations of gain or loss, and she may also 
be influenced by current anticipatory utility. Similarly to 
other models of reference-dependent utility, it seems to be 
an appropriate first approximation to ignore these issues.SEPTEMBER 2007 1060 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
plausible situation, the decision maker prefers p 
5 0 over a small p . 0.
20 Intuitively, raising 
expectations of getting g makes an outcome of 
no gain feel more painful. To avoid such disap-
pointments, the person would rather give up the 
fragile hope of making gains. In fact, if gain-
loss  utility  is  sufficiently  important,  reducing 
exposure to sensations of loss is the decision 
maker’s central concern.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose m1 # 2 is linear and 
the decision maker faces the finite choice set D 
containing the deterministic outcome w and no 
greater deterministic outcomes. For any given 
m01 # 2 satisfying A2, there is an h such that if 
m1 # 2 5 hm01 # 2 with h . h, the unique CPE 
is to choose w.
While the tendency to choose a stochastically 
dominated lottery may seem counterintuitive, it 
is consistent both with the flavor of some dis-
cussions in the psychology literature on welfare 
in risky situations, and with some experimen-
tal results on risk taking. Shane Frederick and 
George Loewenstein (1999) discuss, for exam-
ple, how a prisoner may be made worse off by 
a small chance of being released, because that 
makes the outcome of remaining in prison much 
more difficult to bear. In the domain being exam-
ined in this paper, Uri Gneezy, John A. List, and 
George Wu (2006) find situations where risky 
choices  are  valued  less  than  their  worst  pos-
sible outcome. We also feel that the preference 
for a stochastically dominated lottery captures 
in extreme form the strong risk aversion con-
sumers display when purchasing insurance for 
long-term  modest-scale  losses,  choosing  low 
deductibles on existing insurance, and selecting 
expensive fixed-fee contracts for services.
There are ways in which our result must be 
qualified,  however.  The  preference  for  domi-
nated  lotteries  clearly  arises  only  when  such 
lotteries  reduce  exposure  to  gain-loss  sensa-
tions. In addition, diminishing sensitivity can 
substantially reduce a person’s dislike of risk for 
modest stakes: as the gain g in the lottery above 
increases, the sensation of loss from comparing 
nothing to g increases more and more slowly, 
20 It  is  easy  to  check  that  h1l  2  12  .  1  whenever 
observed  loss  aversion  is  at  least  two-to-one—whenever 
whereas consumption utility increases linearly. 
And as we discuss in the conclusion, people may 
underappreciate how coming to expect the gain 
increases future sensations of loss, and hence 
may not be averse to choosing the lottery.
The  possibility  of  rejecting  a  probabilistic 
gain under CPE but not under PPE reflects a 
more general sense in which people are more 
risk averse under CPE than PPE. Proposition 8 
establishes that under A3
r, if the decision maker 
chooses the less risky one of two lotteries in PPE, 
she does not choose the riskier one in CPE.
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose m1 # 2 is linear, A39 
holds, and for different lotteries F and Fr in the 
decision maker’s choice set, Fr is a mean-pre-
serving spread of F 1 k  for some constant k. If 
F is a PPE, Fr is not a CPE.
The intuition derives directly from the deci-
sion maker’s desire to avoid risky expectations. 
That F is a PPE implies that holding the refer-
ence point fixed at F, the person prefers F to F9. 
When her choice affects the reference lottery in 
addition to the outcome lottery, as in CPE, her 
dislike of risky reference points leads her to pre-
fer F to F9 even more.
The most important implication of Proposi-
tion 8 is that people will be more risk averse 
when  decisions  are  committed  to  well  in 
advance  than  when  people  are  uncommitted. 
But the same results also say that the availabil-
ity of some risky options—exactly those that the 
decision maker takes in PPE but would not take 
in CPE—decreases welfare in PPE. Intuitively, 
in PPE the decision maker realizes that she will 
take a lottery that is attractive fixing expecta-
tions, and because she incorporates the possibil-
ity of good outcomes into her reference point, her 
sense of loss from low outcomes is increased.
Both the similarities and differences between 
PPE  and  CPE  are  illustrated  in  Table  1.   
Comparing  the  second  and  third  panels  for 
Gamble I, for any given amount of background 
risk,  CPE  choices  are  more  risk  averse  than 
PPE choices. Nevertheless, CPE behavior also 
approaches risk neutrality with even moderate 
amounts of background risk.
overall sensitivity to losses, 1 1 hl, is at least twice as high 
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model is due to a systematic misspecification 
of that model, and a great deal of the variation 
reflects reference-dependent utility. In addition 
to the patterns identified in previous sections, our 
model predicts a systematic relationship between 
the inferred coefficient of risk aversion and the 
scale at which it is measured: when measured on 
large-stakes data, single- and double-digit coef-
ficients will be found; when measured on mod-
est-stakes data, triple-digit coefficients will be 
found; and when measured on small-stakes data, 
coefficients too embarrassingly large to report 
will be found. Indeed, Raj Chetty (2005) shows 
that existing evidence on the income elasticity 
of labor supply comfortably bounds the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion from above by two. 
Based  on  hypothetical  choices  between  large 
gambles on lifetime wealth, Robert B. Barsky 
et al. (1997) measure an average coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of around five. Fitting an 
unemployment  model  with  consumption  and 
search-effort choices to data on unemployment 
durations, Chetty (2003) finds a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of around seven. Rajnish 
Mehra and Edward C. Prescott (1985) estimate 
that to explain the historical equity premium, 
investors must have a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion well in the double digits. The deduct-
ible choices of American homeowners analyzed 
by  Sydnor  (2006)  and  the  risk-taking  behav-
ior of Paraguayan farmers analyzed by Laura 
Schechter (2005) imply coefficients of relative 
risk aversion in the triple digits. And although 
risk attitudes are often measured in small-stakes 
laboratory experiments, coefficients calculated 
using the same mathematics as those above are 




Several complications limit the degree to which 
our model moves us to a full understanding of 
21 Many papers that report small coefficients of risk aver-
sion for small stakes do so by dint of using the same termi-
nology to describe mathematically different measures. By 
variously defining wealth as monthly income or potential 
income over the course of a one-hour experiment rather 
than lifetime wealth, these papers report figures that are 
orders of magnitude different from measures using wealth 
levels similar to those in the estimates above.
V.  Immodest Risk
We now illustrate some of our model’s impli-
cations  for  attitudes  toward  large-scale  risk, 
showing that for such stakes m1 # 2 can become 
largely  irrelevant  in  determining  risk  prefer-
ences. Combined with the previous three sec-
tions, this means that our model can reconcile 
highly  context-dependent  behavior  in  modest-
stakes gambles with context-independent “clas-
sical” predictions for larger stakes.
Proposition 9 shows that, when diminishing 
sensitivity  is  a  significant-enough  feature  of 
gain-loss utility, the expected utility from very 
risky outcomes is little influenced by the refer-
ence point.
PROPOSITION 9: Suppose m[ has full range   
and limxS` m91x2 5 limxS2` m91x2 5 0. For 
any r, r9 [ R, r . r9 and e . 0, there is a 
d . 0  such  that  if  F  is  continuously  distrib-
uted with density less than d everywhere, then 
0 # U1F0rr2 2 U1F0r2 , e.
If F is a very risky gamble, most of its out-
comes are far from both r and rr. Since sensi-
tivity of gain-loss utility to changes approaches 
zero for comparisons far apart, for a typical out-
come of F it makes little difference whether it is 
being compared to r or rr.
Beyond  this  analytical  result,  our  model’s 
predictions  for  large-scale  risks  can  be  illus-
trated by applying the parameterized version we 
have considered above to larger stakes. Table 1 
performs this exercise for two gambles. Gamble 
II  is  a  fifty-fifty  gamble  that  yields  either 
$990, 000 or $1, 010, 000, and Gamble III is a 
fifty-fifty  gamble  that  yields  either  $500, 000 
or $1, 500, 000. While the qualitative patterns 
of  behavior  are  similar  for  the  $100-stakes 
Gamble  I  and  the  $10,000-stakes  Gamble  II, 
the sensitivity of behavior to the environment 
is significantly smaller in the latter case. And 
for the $500,000 gamble, risk attitudes are close 
to what they would be without gain-loss utility, 
being  largely  determined  by  m1 # 2  indepen-
dently of the environment.
The wide range of r ~’s in Table 1 replicates 
an  observation  that  an  increasing  number  of 
researchers have become aware of: that the wild 
variation  in  measured  risk  aversion  inferred 
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reference-dependent risk preferences. A weak-
ness that our theory shares with other models 
is that it takes as one of its primitives the set of 
decisions and risks a person is considering, as 
distinct from all the decisions and risks she is 
facing. In fact, as Barberis, Huang, and Thaler 
(2006) emphasize in their setting, Propositions 2 
and 6 can be interpreted as saying that if people 
incorporated all the risks they are facing into 
their expectations, reference dependence would 
essentially  not  affect  risk  attitudes—because 
people  would  essentially  be  neutral  to  small 
risks.  Although  psychological  evidence  does 
indicate that people often “narrowly bracket”—
they isolate individual decisions and risks from 
relevant  other  decisions—relatively  little  is 
known about the extent, patterns, and effects of 
such bracketing phenomena.
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Another major limitation of our model con-
cerns  welfare.  Although  the  analysis  empha-
sized behavioral implications of our model, a 
welfare interpretation was implicit throughout 
and  explicit  at  times.  Insofar  as  the  hedonic 
effects of choice include both gain-loss sensa-
tions and consumption utility, our utility func-
tion may provide a useful welfare measure. For 
two specific reasons, however, we are more hesi-
tant about our model’s welfare implications than 
about its behavioral implications. First, the nar-
row bracketing discussed above may lead people 
to care too much prospectively about a gain or 
loss whose effects are likely to be eliminated 
afterward by an offsetting loss or gain. Second, 
evidence  indicates  that  people  underestimate 
how quickly the reference point will adjust to a 
choice, and hence put too much weight on gain-
loss  sensations  when  making  decisions.
23  For 
22  For  papers  highlighting  the  role  of  bracketing  in 
this and other domains, see Kahneman and Dan Lovallo 
(1993), Shlomo Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Daniel Read, 
Loewenstein,  and  Rabin  (1999),  Thaler  (2000),  and 
Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006).
23 For interpretation of evidence along these lines, see 
Kahneman’s (2003) discussion of the “transition heuristic,” 
and  Loewenstein,  Ted  O’Donoghue,  and  Rabin’s  (2003) 
formulation of “projection bias.”
both these reasons, the appropriate welfare mea-
sure is likely to be closer to consumption utility 
than we assume in this paper. This could sig-
nificantly alter some of our welfare conclusions. 
For  example,  although  we  showed  above  that 
the availability of a lottery can (in PPE) lower 
welfare defined to include gain-loss disutility, 
the same analysis implies that this would not be 
possible for welfare based solely on consump-
tion utility.
The underestimation of changes in the refer-
ence point also has behavioral implications. If a 
person underestimates the effect of changes in 
her expectations on her preferences, she may not 
appreciate fully how she can rid herself of sensa-
tions of loss by ridding herself of risky expecta-
tions. Because our predictions of first-order risk 
aversion are driven partly by a person’s desire to 
avoid risky expectations, this underappreciation 
can reduce risk aversion.
Our model also glosses over a set of issues 
related to what outcomes a person pays attention 
to. In contrast to our formal model, different 
outcomes resulting from the same choice often 
differ in salience. As noted in Sydnor (2006), for 
instance, having to pay for repairing an unin-
sured house is a very salient loss, but not having 
to pay is unlikely to result in a salient sensation 
of gain. A person who focuses mostly on such 
losses presumably has an even stronger taste for 
insurance than our model predicts.
Finally, our model ignores a source of util-
ity—anticipatory emotions—that seems impor-
tant in many risky situations. For instance, an 
investor’s  anxiety  about  funding  her  child’s 
education  is  likely  to  affect  both  her  welfare 
and  many  of  her  financial  decisions.  Insofar 
as anticipatory feelings are about future con-
sumption and gain-loss utilities, our qualitative 
results would not be affected by adding them 
to the model. Quantitatively, however, anticipa-
tory emotions can affect the degree of risk aver-
sion; Andrew Caplin and John Leahy (2001), for 
instance, show that the attempt to avoid anxiety 
about uncertain outcomes can increase a per-
son’s preference for riskless options.
Appendix A: Further Definitions and Results
In this appendix we present an array of concepts and results that may be of practical use in apply-
ing our model, but that are not key to any of the main points of the paper. The first result identifies a VOL. 97 NO. 4 1063 KO �SzEgI ANd RABIN: REFERENCE-dEPENdENT RISK ATTITudES
condition such that with the reference point being the status quo, the decision maker rejects all fair 
gambles.
PROPOSITION 10: Suppose m1  · 2 is linear and the reference point is $0. The decision maker rejects 
all fair gambles if and only if limxS` m912x2 $ m91102. 
Assumption A3 allows the decision maker’s risk lovingness in losses to be much stronger than her 
risk aversion in gains, which may even lead her to accept unfair gambles given a reference point of 
$0. Proposition 10 says that when m1  · 2 is linear, a necessary and sufficient additional condition to 
rule out such possibilities is that sensitivity to losses is everywhere greater than sensitivity to gains. 
When m1  · 2 is concave, this condition is of course sufficient, but not necessary.
For our results on PPE and CPE behavior, we introduce three definitions characterizing the riski-
ness of lotteries. Our first definition is the conventional one of second-order stochastic dominance, 
except that it allows comparisons of lotteries with different means.
DEFINITION 4: A lottery F is less risky than the lottery F9 if F9 is a mean-preserving spread of 
F 1 k for some constant k [ R.
Because it turns out to be an especially pertinent measure of riskiness in our model, we also intro-
duce a more specific concept that is (to our knowledge) undefined and unexplored in the literature on 
risk preferences.
DEFINITION 5: The average self-distance of a lottery F is
  S1F2 K 
5 
Zx 2 yZ  dF1x2dF1y2.
The average self-distance of a lottery is the average distance between two independent draws from 
the lottery. A lower self-distance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for one lottery to be unam-
biguously less risky than another.
LEMMA 1: If F is less risky than F9, then F has lower average self-distance than F9.
Finally, we introduce a measure for how a lottery’s possible gains compare to its possible losses.
DEFINITION 6: For a lottery F, let F1 5 EF [max{x,0}] and F25 EF[max{2x,0}]. The favorability 
of F is defined as F1F2 ; 1 if F1 5 F2 5 0, F1F2 5 ` if F1 . 0, and F2 5 0 and F1F2 K F1/F2 
otherwise.
The favorability of a lottery is the ratio of the average gain of the lottery (relative to zero) and the 
average loss. Using the concepts above, Proposition 11 precisely identifies the extent of the decision 
maker’s first-order risk aversion, generalizing Arrow’s theorem to reference-dependent risky choice. 
This extends the limit result of Proposition 3 in the text, which said that small bets that are insuf-
ficiently better than fair will be rejected.
PROPOSITION 11: Suppose w [ R, and F is a lottery with bounded support.
(i) If F1F2 , 11 1 mr      21022/11 1 mr      11022, then there exists a t . 0 such that for any positive 
t , t, the unique PPE in the choice set {w, w 1 t ? F} is to choose w. 
If  F1F2 . 11 1 mr      21022/11 1 mr      11022,  then  there  exists  a  t . 0  such  that  for  any  positive 
t , t, the unique PPE in the choice set {w, w 1 t ? F} is to choose w 1 t ? F.SEPTEMBER 2007 1064 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
(ii) If 2E[F] , 1m92102 2 m911022S[F], then there exists a t . 0 such that for any positive t , t, the 
unique CPE in the choice set {w, w 1 t ? F} is to choose w. If 2E[F] . 1m92102 2 m9 1 102S[F], then 
there exists a t . 0 such that for any positive t , t, the unique CPE in the choice set {w, w 1 t ? F} 
is to choose w 1 t ? F.
Part (i) states that when applying PPE, small bets will be accepted if and only if their favorability 
is greater than the “coefficient of loss aversion” associated with u1w0r2 —which is the slope ratio at 
the kink in u1w0r2 at w 5 r. Part (ii) says that when applying CPE, a small bet will be accepted if and 
only if twice its expected value is greater than the product of its average self-distance and the differ-
ence in the decision maker’s sensitivity to small losses and small gains.
Proposition 12 shows that when consumption utility is linear and A3
r holds, we can characterize a 
person’s CPE attitude toward a lottery purely in terms the lottery’s mean and average self-distance.
PROPOSITION 12: Suppose m1w2 5 w and m1 # 2 meets A39. Then,
(i) For any lottery F,
  u1F|F2 5 E[F] 2 
1
2
 h1l 2 12S[F].
(ii) For a finite choice set d, define y1d) 5 {F [ d|4F9 [ d, either 1a2 S[F] , S[F9], or 1b2 S[F] 
5 S[F9] and E[F] $ E[F9]}. For a sufficiently high h, y1D2 is the set of CPE.
Part (ii) represents a lexicographic ranking of lotteries by their lowest average self-distance, and 
then the highest mean. There will generally be a unique lottery with minimal average self-distance, 
in which case that lottery is chosen when gain-loss utility is very important—even if it is stochasti-
cally dominated by other options.
The role of average self-distance in determining a person’s CPE choices when A39 holds is best 
seen with a simple but striking observation. In a personal equilibrium of any sort, every possible 
sensation of gain—say from comparing an outcome x to a counterfactual y , x —is matched by an 
equally likely and equally large loss—from comparing y to x. Because the losses are more heavily 
felt, net gain-loss utility will be proportional to the negative of the average of these distances.
Finally, we show two properties of risky choice in our model that it shares with the standard model. 
Although expected risk decreases aversion to risk under either of our solution concepts, without 
diminishing sensitivity it never eliminates the risk aversion completely.
PROPOSITION 13: Suppose m1 # 2 is linear, A39 holds, and F second-order stochastically dominates 
Fr 2 F. Then both the unique PPE and the unique CPE from the choice set {F, F9} is to choose F.
We also note that if F first-order stochastically dominates F9 , then for any given reference lottery 
the decision maker prefers F to F9 . Hence, choosing F9 cannot be a UPE. While mathematically 
trivial, this result is of interest because it contrasts with some of our results for CPE.
PROPOSITION 14: Suppose the decision maker faces the choice set d. If F [ D first-order stochas-
tically dominates F9, then F9 is not a uPE.
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Appendix B: Extracting m[ and m[ from Behavior
In this appendix, we provide an algorithm that identifies a person’s full utility function from her 
behavior (as long as the consumption utility m[ inferred in the first step is continuous). Once this 
24 In fact, this result relies solely on Assumption A1, guaranteeing that u1wZr2 is increasing in w, and on no other feature of m.VOL. 97 NO. 4 1065 KO �SzEgI ANd RABIN: REFERENCE-dEPENdENT RISK ATTITudES
utility function is identified, our theory provides a prediction for behavior in any decision over mon-
etary risk. To determine m1 # 2, our algorithm works whenever m1 # 2 has unbounded support; minor 
modifications cover the opposite case as well.
As we note in Section IV, when a person makes decisions over risk with immediate resolution and 
delayed consequences, the natural extension of CPE predicts that she maximizes expected consump-
tion utility. This means that we can identify m1 # 2 up to an affine transformation using standard 
revealed-preference techniques. Once m1 # 2 is identified and a normalization is chosen (e.g., setting 
m11,000,0012 2 m11,000,0002 5 1), the next two parts of our procedure allow us to infer m1a2 and 
m1 2 a2 for any given a . 0. Carrying out these steps for all a . 0 identifies the entire function 
m1 # 2.
For a given a, we find wealth levels w0,w1,w2 such that m1w22 2 m1w12 5 m1w12 2 m1w02 5 a. 
Then, we find the wealth level wCE such that in CPE the person is indifferent between a deterministic 
wCE and a fifty-fifty gamble that pays either w0 or w1. This certainty equivalent will satisfy









1m1a21 m12 a22 5 m1wCE2,
so that we have identified m1a2 1 m1 2 a2. Intuitively, because the ex ante evaluation of risks 
involved in CPE pairs any possible loss with a corresponding equally weighted gain, CPE behavior 
allows us to infer the difference between the pain from a loss and the pleasure from the same-sized 
gain. But for the same reason, CPE behavior cannot identify how large the pain and pleasure are.
To identify how big they are, we can identify the ratio of m1a2 and 0m1 2 a20 by eliciting the prob-
ability p . 1/2 such that a surprise chance  p of a gain of a compensates the person for a surprise 
chance 1 2 p of a loss of a. Specifically, we find the probability p such that when expecting w1, the 
person is indifferent between w1 and a gamble that pays w2 with probability p and w0 with probability 
1 2 p. To do this, we tell her that she will get w1 with probability 1 2 e and the choice with prob-
ability e, and we let e S 0. Then, p satisfies
(6)  pm1w22 1 11 2 p2m1w02 1 pm1a2 1 11 2 p2m1 2 a2 5 m1w12,
and if A2 is satisfied, p  . 1/2. Equation (6) can be rearranged to show that
  m1 2 a2 5 
p
2p 2 1
 1m1a2 1 m12 a22 1 a; 
  m1a2 5 2
1 2 p
2p 2 1
 1m1a2 1 m1 2 a22 1 a,
which identifies m1 2 a2 and m1a2 based solely on the person’s observed choices.
Appendix C: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
 Let F1 5 EF[max{x,0}] and F25 EF[max{2x, 0}]. F1 and F2 are respectively the expected gains 
and losses of lottery F relative to 0. 
Clearly, U1w 1 F0w2 $ U1w0w2 if and only if 11 1 h2F1 $ 11 1 hl2F2. Now U1H 1 F0G2 $ 
U1H0G2 is equivalent to
  8  [w 1 w9 1 m 1w 1 w9 2 r2]  dg1r2dH1w2dF1w92 $ 5  [w 1 m1w 2 r2]  dg1r2dH1w2SEPTEMBER 2007 1066 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
or
  8  [w9 1 m1w 1 w9 2 r2 2 m1w 2 r2]  dg1r2dH1w2dF1w92 $ 0.
Notice that for any wr $ 0, m1w 1 wr 2 r2 2 m1w 2 r2 $ hwr, and for any wr # 0, m1w 1 wr 2 r2 
2 m1w 2 r2 $ hlwr. Hence
  8  [w9 1 m1w 1 w9 2 r2 2 m1w 2 r2]  dg1r2dH1w2dF1w92
      $ 8  [w9 1 hmax{w9, 0} 1 hlmin{w9, 0}]  dg1r2  dH1w2dF1w92 
      5 11 1 h2F12 11 1 hl2 F2 $ 0.
This completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
For each part of the proposition, we prove the first inequality 1U1H 1 F0G2 . U1H0G2 in part (i), 
and U1H 1 t # F0G2 . U1H0G2 in part (ii)). The other inequality is analogous.
Let F9 be the mean-zero lottery that satisfies F9 1 v 5 F for a constant v . 0.
(i) We prove that for any e1 . 0, there are A, e . 0 such that if Prg1r [ [k 2 A, k 1 A]2 , e for 
all k [ R then for any a [ R, 
(7)  5  1m1a 1 w 2 r2 2 m1a 2 r22  dF91w2  dg1r2 . 2 e1.
This  is  sufficient  because  it  implies  that  U1H 1 Fr0G2 2 U1H0G2 . 2 e1,  and  hence 
U1H 1 F0G2 2 U1H0G2 $ U1H 1 Fr0G2 2 U1H0G2 1 v . v 2 e1 . 0 for e1 sufficiently small.
Since m is differentiable other than at zero and is concave in gains and convex in losses, both 
limxS` m91x2 and limxS2` m91x2 exist. This implies that for any e2 . 0, there is an A such that
  h1b2 K 2  1m1b 1 w2 2 m1b22  dF91w2 . 2 e2
for any 0b0 . A. h is also bounded; let its bound be M. Notice that
  5  1m1a 1 w 2 r2 2 m1a 2 r22  dF91w2  dg1r2 5 2  h1a 2 r2  dg1r2.
Since Prg[a 2 r [ [2A, A]] , e and h1 # 2 . 2 e2 outside this range, the integral above is greater 
than  2 eM 2 e2. Therefore, we can choose A, e, and e2 such that if g satisfies the conditions of the 
proposition, the integral above is greater than  2 e1.
(ii) Whenever G1 # 2 is a continuous distribution, the function
  h[ K 2  u1?|r2  dg1r2
is differentiable everywhere. Hence, for any w [ R,
      lim
tS`
 
e3h1w 1 t   # wr2 2 h1w24  dFr1wr2
t








 e3h1w 1 t   # wr2 2 h1w24  dFr1wr2
t









PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
 (The proof below establishes the result for both PPE and CPE (Definition 3 in Section IV). The 
proof uses the concept of average self-distance defined in Appendix A.)
Let g 5 F 1 k. As in the proof of Proposition 1, let g1 5 Eg[max{x,0}] and g2 5 Eg[max{2 x, 
 0}]. Let k { be defined by G1/G2 5 11 1 mr      21022/11 1 mr      11022. Clearly, k { . 0. Then for any k { , k { 
we have G1/G2 , 11 1 mr      21022/11 1 mr      11022. We prove that for any such G, there is a t{ satisfying 









e3max50, t wr6 1 m1max50, twr624  d   G1wr2 1 e3min50, t wr6 1 m1min50, twr624  dG1wr2
t
    5 11 1 m9 1102g1 2 11 1 m9 2102g2, 0.











w9  dg1w92 1 
4m1t1wr 2 r22  dG1wr2 dG1r2
t
      5
2 













  1m9 1102 2 m9 21022Z w9 2 rZ  dg1w92dg1r2
  5
2 
w9  dg1w92 2 
1
2
 1m9 2102 2 m9 11022S1g2 
  # g12 g22 1m92102 2 m9110221g11 g22 
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where the second-to-last inequality is true because G1 $ G2. This establishes that w is both a PPE 
and CPE.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
(The proof below establishes the result for both PPE and CPE (Definition 3 in Section IV).)
By the proof of Proposition 8, if w is a UPE, then U1w0w2 . U1w 1 F0w 1 F2, so that w is the 
PPE. This means that if w 1 F is a PPE, then it must be the case that w is not a UPE. This is equiva-
lent to U1w 1 F0w2 . U1w0w2. Then, by Proposition 1, the result is immediate.
To establish the result for CPE, suppose w 1 F is a CPE. By Proposition 8, w is not a PPE. Then, 
by the same logic as above, it must be the case that w is not a UPE. From here, the proof is the same 
as above.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
(The proof below establishes the result for both PPE and CPE (Definition 3 in Section IV).)
By  a  trivial  modification  of  the  proof  of  Proposition  1,  U1w 1 F0w2 . U1w0w2  implies 
U1G 1 F0G2 . U1G0G2.  Hence,  U1G 1 F0G2 # U1G0G2  implies  U1w 1 F0w2 # U1w0w2. 
Therefore, choosing w is a UPE in the choice set {w, w 1 F}. Then, by the proof of Proposition 8, 
U1w0w2 . U1w 1 F0w 1 F2, so w is the PPE.
We now prove the same statement for CPE. We want to prove that if U1G0G2 $ U1G 1 F0G 1 F2, 
then U1w0w2 $ U1w 1 F0w 1 F2. Since w just shifts both sides of the latter inequality by a constant, 
it is sufficient to prove for w 5 0. We will prove that U1F0F2 # U1G 1 F0G 1 F2 2 U1G0G2.
Notice that the two sides are equal in consumption utility (which is equal to the expectation of F). 
Hence, we prove the inequality for the gain-loss-utility component. We take advantage of a geometric 
analogy: for any distribution H, the negative of the gain-loss utility part of U1H0H2 is proportional 
to the average self-distance of H. Therefore, the statement above is equivalent to the following: when 
the distribution F is added to the distribution g, the increase in the average self-distance is lower than 
the average self-distance of F. To show this, consider any two realizations a and b of g, and any two 
realizations x and y of F. By the triangle inequality,
  01a 1 x2 2 1b 1 y20 # 0a 2 b0 1 0x 2 y0
or
  01a 1 x2 2 1b 1 y20 2 0a 2 b0 # 0x 2 y0,
completing the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
(The proof below establishes the result for both PPE and CPE (Definition 3 in Section IV).)
As in the proof of Proposition 2, for each part of the proposition we prove the first part of the 
statement. Also as in the proof of that proposition, define Fr as the mean-zero lottery such that 
Fr 1 v 5 F for a constant v . 0.
(i) As an obvious implication of Proposition 2, there are A, e . 0 such that the unique UPE, and 
hence also the PPE, is to choose G 1 F.
The proof for CPE is only slightly more complicated. By the proof of Proposition 2, for any e1 . 0   
there are A, e . 0  such that if Prg 1r [ [k 2 A, k 1 A]2 , e for all k [ R, then U1G 1 Fr0G2 2 U1G0G2   
. 2 e1. Applying a similar argument, there are A, e . 0  such that if Prg 1r [ [k 2 A, k 1 A]2 , e for all 
k [ R, U1G 1 Fr0G 1 Fr2 2 U1G 1 Fr0G2 . 2 e1. Hence, there are A,P . 0 such that if Prg 1r [ 
[2 A, A]2  , e, U1G 1 F0G 1 F2 2 U1G0G2 5 U1G 1 Fr0G 1 Fr2 2 U1G0G2 1 v . v 2 2e1 . 0 
for a sufficiently small e1.
(ii) By Proposition 2, there is a t . 0 such that for t , t, the unique UPE, and hence also the PPE, 
in the choice set {g, g 1 tF} is to choose G 1 tF.VOL. 97 NO. 4 1069 KO �SzEgI ANd RABIN: REFERENCE-dEPENdENT RISK ATTITudES











U1G 1 t # F0G 1 t # F2 2 U1G0G2
t
5 v . 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
For any lottery F,
(8)    u1FZF2 5 E[F] 1 h 5  1m01w9 2 r2  dF1r2 dF1w92 
  5 E[F] 1 
1
2
 h 51m01Zw9 2 rZ2 1 m012Zw9 2 rZ22 dF1r2dF1w92    .
 
  K 2 n(F)
By A2, n1F2 . 0 for any nondeterministic lottery F. Let x 5 minF[d, F Z w  n1F2 and y 5 maxF[d, F Z wE3F4. 
If h . 21y 2 w2/x, the unique CPE is to choose w.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
We prove that if F is a UPE, then U1F0F2 . U1Fr0Fr2, so that Fr is not a CPE. If Fr 5 F 1 k for 
some k, then the result is immediate, since in that case we would otherwise have to have k , 0.
That F is a UPE when Fr is available implies that U1F0F2 $ U1Fr0F2. Hence, there is a constant 
kr $ 0 such that for Fs 5 Fr 1 kr, we have U1F0F2 5 U1Fs0F2. We prove that U1F0F2 . U1Fs0Fs2, 
which is sufficient because U1Fs0Fs2 $ U1Fr0Fr2.
The condition that U1Fs0F2 5 U1F0F2 can be written as
(9)  2  w  dF01w2 1 5  m1w 2 r2  dF1r2dF01w2 5 2  w  dF1w2 1 5  m1w 2 r2  dF1r2dF1w2.
Clearly,  we  must  have  1  w  dF1w2  ,  1  w  dF01w2.  Otherwise,  because  m  is  strictly  increas-
ing  and  concave  and  Fs  is  riskier  than  F,  we  would  have  J  m1w  2  r2  dF1r2dF01w2  ,   
J  m1w 2 r2  dF1r2 dF1w2, a contradiction.
We want to prove that
  2  w  dF01w2 1 5  m1w 2 r2  dF01r2 dF01w2 , 2  w  dF1w) 1 5  m1w 2 r2 dF1r2  dF1w2.
Given equation (9), this is equivalent to
  5  m1w 2 r2  dF01r2 dF01w2 , 5  m1w 2 r2  dF1r2 dF01w2.
Now, since the mean of Fs is greater than that of F, there is a ks . 0 such that Fs 2 ks and F have 
the same mean. Notice that
  5  m1w 2 r2  dF01r2 dF01w2 , 5  m1w 2 r2  d1F0 2 k021r2 dF01w2,SEPTEMBER 2007 1070 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
which in turn is less than or equal to
  5  m1w 2 r2  dF1r2dF01w2
because Fs 2 ks is a mean-preserving spread of F and m is concave. This completes the proof.
Proof of PROPOSITION 9:
Let M 5 2m121m1r2 2 m1r9222. By properties A2 and A3 of m1 # 2, m1x 1 m1r2 2 m1r922 2 m1x2 
# M for any x [ R.
Since limxSq m91x2 5 limxS2q m91x2 5 0, for any e1 . 0, there is an A such that if 0x0 . A, then 
mr1x2 , e1. Furthermore, since m1 # 2 has full range, for all e2 . 0 there is a d . 0 such that if the 
density of F is less than d everywhere, PrF [m1w2 [ [m1r92 2 A, m1r2 1 A]] , e2. Denote the interval 
[m1r92 2 A, [m1r2 2 A] by B. Under these conditions,
  u1FZr92 2 u1FZr2 5 2  3m1m1w2 2 m1r922 2 m1m1w2 2 m1r224  dF1w2 
  5  3
m1w2[B
3m1m1w2 2 m1r922 2 m1m1w2 2 m1r224  dF1w2 1
  3
m1w2oB
3m1m1w2 2 m1r922 2 m1m1w2 2 m1r224  dF1w2 
  # e2M 1 e11m1r2 2 m1r922,
which is less than e for appropriately chosen e1,e2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10: 
Obvious.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
Since constant shifts in a distribution clearly leave the average self-distance unchanged, we can 
assume without loss of generality that F and Fr have the same mean. Then, using that the absolute-
value function is convex,
  5  Zx 2 yZ  dF1x2 dF1y2 # 5  Zx 2 yZ  dF91x2 dF1y2
  5 5  Zx 2 yZ  dF1y2 dF91x2 # 5  Zx 2 yZ  dF91y2 dF91x2.
Proof of PROPOSITION 11: 
Obvious from the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of PROPOSITION 12: 
Part (i) follows from equation (8). Part (ii) is trivial from part (i).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13: 
Notice that under A3
r, the utility function u1?ZF2 5 eu1?Zr2  dF1r2 is weakly concave. Hence, 
U1F0F2 $ U1Fr0F2, so that choosing F is a UPE.VOL. 97 NO. 4 1071 KO �SzEgI ANd RABIN: REFERENCE-dEPENdENT RISK ATTITudES
We now prove that U1F0F2 . U1Fr0Fr2, both completing the proof that F is a PPE and proving 
that it is a CPE. Since the expected consumption utilities cancel, this inequality is equivalent to
  5  m1w 2 r2  dF1w2dF1r2 . 5  m1w 2 r2  dF91w2 dF91r2,
or S1F2 , S1Fr2. To show this, note that by the convexity of the absolute-value function,
  5  Zw 2 rZ  dF1w2 dF1r2 # 5  Zw 2 rZ  dF91w2 dF1r2 5 5  Zw 2 rZ  dF1r2 dF91w2.
Using the same reasoning and that Fr 2 F, the above is strictly less than
  5  Zw 2 rZ  dF91r2 dF91w2 5 5  Zw 2 rZ  dF91w2 dF91r2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 14: 
For any reference lottery g, the function
  u1?Zg2 52  u1?Zr2  dg1r2
is strictly increasing. Hence, for any two distributions F, F9 such that F first-order stochastically 
dominates F9, U1F0G2 . U1Fr0G2. This implies that F9 cannot be a UPE when F is available.
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